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A B S T R A C T
A coherent practice of mens rea (‘guilty mind’) ascription in criminal law presupposes a concept of mens rea
which is insensitive to the moral valence of an action’s outcome. For instance, an assessment of whether an agent
harmed another person intentionally should be unaﬀected by the severity of harm done. Ascriptions of in-
tentionality made by laypeople, however, are subject to a strong outcome bias. As demonstrated by the Knobe
eﬀect, a knowingly incurred negative side eﬀect is standardly judged intentional, whereas a positive side eﬀect is
not. We report the ﬁrst empirical investigation into intentionality ascriptions made by professional judges, which
ﬁnds (i) that professionals are sensitive to the moral valence of outcome type, and (ii) that the worse the
outcome, the higher the propensity to ascribe intentionality. The data shows the intentionality ascriptions of
professional judges to be inconsistent with the concept of mens rea supposedly at the foundation of criminal law.
1. Introduction: the Knobe eﬀect and criminal jurisprudence
1.1. Two concepts of intentionality
Consider Knobe’s well-known CHAIRMAN scenario: The chairman of a
company is approached by his advisor, who recommends a new busi-
ness strategy. The strategy is expected to increase proﬁts and to harm
the environment. The chairman responds that he does not care about
the environment and gives his advisor the green light. Everything turns
out as predicted: Proﬁts increase and the environment suﬀers. Did the
chairman harm the environment intentionally? The overwhelming
majority of philosophically uninitiated people judge the foreseen ne-
gative side eﬀect intentional. But faced with identical cases that diﬀer
only in so far as the outcome is not negative but positive (i.e. the en-
vironment beneﬁts from the new strategy), the side eﬀect is pre-
dominantly judged as a nonintentional by-product of the main action.
The asymmetry – frequently called the ‘Knobe eﬀect’ – has been widely
replicated (Knobe, 2003a, 2003b, 2004; Mele & Cushman, 2007; for
survey articles, cf. Cova, 2016; Feltz, 2007). The eﬀect is found robustly
across diﬀerent cultures (Dalbauer &Hergovich, 2013; Knobe & Burra,
2006) and ages (Leslie, Knobe, & Cohen, 2006). It extends to a wide
range of ascriptions of mental states such as desire (Tannenbaum,
Ditto, & Pizarro, 2007), knowledge (Beebe & Buckwalter, 2010;
Beebe & Jensen, 2012), belief (Beebe, 2013; Kneer, in press) and attri-
butions of non-mental properties such as causal involvement
(Knobe & Fraser, 2008).
The folk concept of intentionality, this suggests, is sensitive to moral
valence – it is morally, or normatively, charged. If the outcome is ne-
gative, foreknowledge standardly suﬃces for people to ascribe in-
tentionality, if it is positive, foreknowledge does standardly not suﬃce.
(‘Standardly’ since the introduction of further factors such as agent
regret can disrupt the asymmetry, cf. Phelan and Sarkissian (2008),
Cushman and Mele (2008) and Cova, Dupoux, and Jacob (2012)). The
folk concept diﬀers from what we will call the clinical concept of in-
tentionality, i.e. the concept prevalent in law and philosophy. On this
view, intentionality involves both a cognitive element, i.e. awareness or
knowledge of the consequences, and a conative element, i.e. a desire or
other pro-attitude to bring about the envisioned consequences. (Adams,
2015; Butler, 1978; Katz, 1987; Mele, 1992; Moore, 2011). For an ac-
tion to count as intentional, both elements are necessary, independently
of the moral valence of the outcome (for dissenting views cf. Harman
(1976) and Lowe (1978), for comparative discussion across law and
philosophy, cf. Duﬀ (1989)). Criminal law standardly invokes the
clinical concept of intentionality. The US Model Penal Code (section
2.02), for instance, distinguishes explicitly between the mens reas in-
tentionality (or purpose) and knowledge (the agent’s awareness that his
actions will produce a certain result). But this distinction could not be
upheld in an unqualiﬁed fashion if knowledge was sometimes suﬃcient
for intentionality, as the Knobe eﬀect suggests.
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1.2. The mismatch between folk psychology and the law
The foregoing discussion suggests a severe mismatch between the
concept of intentionality at the foundation of criminal law on the one
hand, and the folk concept of intentionality on the other. Citizens might
thus misinterpret the law, question the verdicts of high-proﬁle trials
and challenge the law’s legitimacy more generally (Robinson & Darley,
1995; Tyler, 2006). In Anglophone jurisprudence, where laypeople ju-
ries attribute mens rea, the mismatch is particularly problematic: While
the law draws a clear, outcome-independent distinction between the
mens reas of intentionality and knowledge, on the folk view knowledge
can suﬃce for the ascription of intentionality. If this is the case only, or
predominantly, with respect to side eﬀects, then those taken to trial for
harmful side eﬀects are judged by diﬀerent standards than those
charged for harmful main-eﬀects. When main eﬀects are at stake,
foreknowledge is not suﬃcient for intentionality ascription (and thus
the most severe punishment), when side eﬀects are at stake, it is. Note
also that a small, though signiﬁcant minority of laypeople employ a
clinical concept of intentionality. This, too, challenges the principle of a
fair and equal trial for all: Defendants who have acted with mere
foreknowledge (i.e. without a pro-attitude towards the side-eﬀect) will
be attributed the mens rea of knowledge by juries holding the clinical
view, others will be attributed the more inculpating mens rea of in-
tentionality by juries employing the normatively charged concept of
intentionality. Advocates of a strict distinction between intentionality
and foreknowledge are thus concerned that defendants who act with
mere foreknowledge might frequently be judged and punished too
harshly.1
Perhaps, one might think, the impact of the mismatch just described
is exaggerated: The fact that central legal and folk concepts diﬀer does
not mean that the folk cannot grasp, or – under careful instruction as is
common practice in criminal trials – ascribe mens reas as deﬁned by the
law. There is a small empirical literature that investigates whether the
legally uninitiated can competently distinguish the mens reas laid out in
the US model penal code, and whether they can rank them appro-
priately in terms of culpability and punishment. Experiments by P. H.
Robinson and Darley (1995) suggest that, by and large, they can. The
majority of studies (Ginther et al., 2014; Levinson, 2005; Severance,
Goodman, & Loftus, 1992; Shen, Hoﬀman, Jones, Greene, &Marois,
2011) however, report that the folk have considerable diﬃculties in
reliably distinguishing the diﬀerent mens rea concepts and in ranking
their respective culpability in ways consistent with the Model Penal
Code. What is more, the provision of jury instructions are standardly
found to be of little help, which might be one of the reasons why jurors
so frequently ask for clariﬁcations of mens rea concepts in criminal trials
(Lacey, 1993).
Let’s brieﬂy take stock: The Knobe eﬀect reveals a serious mismatch
between the normatively charged folk concept of intentionality and the
clinical concept of intentionality prevalent in criminal law. The mis-
match matters both theoretically and practically, since the legally un-
initiated have diﬃculties adapting to the clinical concept in contexts of
criminal jurisprudence. In order to better understand the conceptual
conﬂict, and devise ways to address it, the next sections explore the
Knobe eﬀect and its implications for the nature of intentional action in
more depth.
1.3. Competence v. bias accounts
The Knobe eﬀect has sparked extensive debate as to whether the
normatively charged concept captures the nature of intentionality
better than the clinical one that dominates the philosophical literature
and the law (for reviews see Feltz (2007), Pettit and Knobe (2009),
Cova (2016)). Certain scholars argue that the Knobe eﬀect constitutes a
bias, and that the folk use of intentionality is frequently distorted
(Adams & Steadman, 2004; Alicke, 2008; Alicke & Rose, 2010;
Nadelhoﬀer, 2004a, 2004b, 2006; Sauer & Bates, 2013). In contrast to
such views, several scholars have argued that the Knobe eﬀect testiﬁes
to people’s competence in intentionality ascriptions (cf. e.g. Hindriks,
2008; Knobe, 2010b; Machery, 2008; Pettit & Knobe, 2009;
Uttich & Lombrozo, 2010). According to Knobe, for instance, in-
tentionality ascriptions are sensitive to moral concerns since the concept
of intentionality itself is constitutively tied to moral features. According
to Uttich and Lombrozo (2010), the conscious violation of salient norms
such as protecting the environment constitutes evidence in favor of
certain mental states such as intentionality, whereas norm-conformance
does not. The view diﬀers from Knobe’s in so far as it invokes a clinical
concept of intentionality, whose application is deemed sensitive to moral
and conventional norms. It diﬀers from bias accounts, since the eva-
luation of behavior vis-à-vis salient norms is considered an epistemically
rewarding, and hence rational, feature of mindreading.
Advocates of competence accounts are inclined to ﬁnd fault with the
law and propose a revision of the legal concept of intentionality (Duﬀ,
2015; Kobick, 2010). Suggestions of this sort echo an inﬂuential article
by Malle and Nelson (2003), who argue that when central legal and folk
concepts are at odds, the law should adopt the latter so as to foster
‘clarity of mens rea concepts and a reconciliation of the legal and the
layperson’s view of human behavior’ (2003: 563). It bears emphasis,
however, that this strategy is only sensible if the folk concepts of mens
rea are suﬃciently uniform and systematic, so as to allow a coherent and
reliable practice of mens rea attribution. Drawing on Malle and Knobe
(1997, 2001), Malle & Nelson argue that most people do indeed con-
verge on a single concept of intentionality (uniformity is thus satisﬁed),
and that said concept ‘is systematic in that the judgments are pre-
dictable from ﬁve core components – belief, desire, intention, aware-
ness, and skill.’ (2003: 574).
The proposal of adopting folk concepts of mens rea for legal pur-
poses can be challenged on two grounds: First, even if suﬃciently
uniform and systematic, the lay notion of intentionality might still be
considered philosophically confused and thus unﬁt for legal purposes
(Adams, 2015). Second, one might have doubts about the uniformity
and systematicity of the folk concepts of mens rea. Uniformity is under
pressure since a signiﬁcant minority does not manifest a side-eﬀect ef-
fect with respect to intentionality. This suggests that there are multiple
folk concepts of intentionality – Cushman and Mele (2008), for in-
stance, identify ‘two and a half’ such concepts, Lanteri (2012) counts
even more. Similar worries regarding uniformity arise for the ascription
of the mens rea of knowledge, where a signiﬁcant minority is not sus-
ceptible to the epistemic side-eﬀect eﬀect, cf. Beebe and Buckwalter
(2010) as well as Beebe and Jensen (2012).
As advocates of bias accounts are quick to point out, the Knobe
eﬀect casts doubt on the systematicity of the folk concept of in-
tentionality: When negative side-eﬀects are at stake, desire – one of
Malle & Nelson’s core components of intentionality – does not seem to
play a role, whereas when positive side-eﬀects or main eﬀects are under
consideration, it does. What is more, evidence by Nadelhoﬀer (2006)
demonstrates that moral factors independent of outcome valence such
as the character of the defendant and victim – certainly not among the
1 A worry: What drives the Knobe eﬀect are diﬀerently valenced outcomes. But – one
might argue – the distinction between positive and negative moral or normative valence
is mute as regards legal matters, since the only outcomes of relevance are negative ones.
One doesn’t get taken to court for exemplary behavior, but for breaking the law, stan-
dardly associated with doing harm or damage. Though there might thus be an asymmetry
across positive and negative outcomes, the fact that only the latter matter ensures
equality before the law: Those doing harm do not get judged diﬀerently from those doing
good, because the latter don’t get judged in court in the ﬁrst place. As the main discussion
should make clear, however, this worry misses the mark. The problematic here addressed
arises not from the asymmetry of intentionality judgments across diﬀerently valenced
outcomes, but from potentially diﬀerent concepts of intentionality at work in criminal law
– one that requires a conative attitude besides foreknowledge, and another one which
does not. Diﬀerently put, the problem arises from the fact that a clear distinction between
the mens reas of intentionality and knowledge is not guaranteed in similarly, that is,
negatively valenced, cases.
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core components of the concept of intentionality – can aﬀect the as-
cription of intentionality and foresight. Nadelhoﬀer thus suggests to
subsume the Knobe eﬀect under Alicke’s culpable control model, whose
explanatory scope extends beyond side-eﬀects. We consider this a
plausible move (for discussion see Alicke (2008), Nichols and Ulatowski
(2007), Cole Wright and Bengson (2009), Knobe (2010b)), and will
brieﬂy outline the culpable control model, as it can serve as a theore-
tical framework for our experiments.
Alicke (1992, 2000, 2008) questions standard moral and legal the-
ories of blame, according to which a ceteris paribus increase in personal
control warrants an increase in blame (schematically: control→
blame). Instead, he argues, the desire to blame an agent sometimes
incites blame ‘amateurs’ (2008:180) to exaggerate evidence regarding
the agent’s personal control (schematically: blame→ control). Blame-
validation operates on three types of personal control corresponding to
the structural links holding between mental states, behavior and con-
sequences which characterize an action: Volitional behavior control (the
mind-behavior link), causal control (the behavior consequence link) and
volitional outcome control (the mind-consequence link), which – roughly
– correspond to intentionality, causation, and foresight (Alicke & Rose,
2010). The Knobe eﬀect can be interpreted as evidence for exaggerated
ascriptions of volitional behavior control, the epistemic side-eﬀect ef-
fect and Nadelhoﬀer’s (2006) results about foresight as instances of
biased assessments of volitional outcome control. There is also ample
evidence consistent with the hypothesis that blame validation increases
causal control ascriptions (Alicke, 2000; Cushman, 2010;
Hitchcock & Knobe, 2009; Knobe & Fraser, 2008).
1.4. Measures to address the mismatch
All parties to the debate agree that the mismatch between legal and
folk concepts of intentionality and other mens reas constitutes a pro-
blem, in particular for countries with a juror system. Competence the-
orists argue that the law must adopt the folk concepts. Bias theorists, by
contrast, might want to advocate the abolishment of juries composed of
laypeople: Legal professionals who are well-versed with the law and its
requirements, and who have received extensive training, one might
suppose, are less susceptible to outcome biases such as the Knobe eﬀect.
A proposal of this sort could parallel the expertise argument which
analytic ‘armchair’ philosophers have employed to call the philoso-
phical import of experimental studies about folk intuitions into ques-
tion. Just as the intuitions and judgments of mathematicians, expert
chess players or physicists, in their areas of competence, are more re-
liable and less susceptible to bias than those of laypeople, so are the
intuitions of analytic philosophers when it comes to conceptual ana-
lysis. (In philosophy, advocates of this view include Kamm (1993),
Kauppinen (2007), Ludwig (2007), Williamson (2008, 2011); for cri-
tical discussion and empirical studies regarding the expertise argument,
cf. for instance Weinberg, Gonnerman, Buckner, and Alexander (2010),
Schulz, Cokely, and Feltz (2011), Machery (2012), Schwitzgebel and
Cushman (2012, 2015), Alexander (2016)). Analogously, one might
argue, the clinical concept of intentionality, dominant in legal scho-
larship and ﬁrmly entrenched in criminal law all over the world, is the
appropriate one, since it is the product of expert judgment and rigorous
conceptual analysis. What is more, its application, in the hands of ex-
perts – that is, professional judges rather than jurors or ‘blame ama-
teurs’ as Alicke calls them – will be insensitive to distortive factors such
as moral or normative valence. Testing this empirical hypothesis con-
stitutes the central goal of this article: We present the ﬁrst experimental
studies about whether the intentionality ascriptions of professional
judges manifest an outcome eﬀect. French judges were chosen since in
France laypeople juries are extremely rare and nearly all criminal trials
are decided by professionals.
The results will be of interest independently of whether one favors a
bias or a competence account of the Knobe eﬀect and similar phe-
nomena. If the concept of intentionality employed by professionals
turns out to be the clinical one, bias theorists could deploy an expertise
argument in favor of institutional change. If, on the other hand, experts,
too, operate with a charged concept of intentionality, competence
theorists might take this as evidence against bias accounts and argue
that it is high time to bring the letter of the law into accord with the
concepts of laypeople and experts. Before reporting the experiments,
we’ll address a few preliminary worries about what has been said so far.
1.5. Potential worries
The above considerations might be called into question on two
grounds. First, the asymmetry in intentionality ascriptions regards side
eﬀects but, one might suppose, these do not play an important role in
jurisprudence. This is incorrect, since many legal cases focus explicitly
on side eﬀects.2 What is more, though side-eﬀect scenarios facilitate the
experimental investigation, the phenomenon is not peculiarly limited to
such cases only – it arises, for instance, also with regards to diﬀerently
valenced means (Cova &Naar, 2012), and the very classiﬁcation of goals,
means and side eﬀects itself (Knobe, 2010a; Ulatowski, 2008, 2012).
Second, various accounts of the Knobe eﬀect challenge the dominant
view according to which intentionality ascriptions are aﬀected directly
by moral or normative considerations. Instead, critics of this view
argue, diﬀerently valenced side-eﬀects engender asymmetric attribu-
tions of outcome-related desires (Guglielmo &Malle, 2010), beliefs
(Alfano, Beebe, & Robinson, 2012), perceived norm-violations (Alfano
et al., 2012; Lombrozo &Uttich, 2010; Uttich & Lombrozo, 2010)
deeply held values and principles (Sripada, 2010, 2012;
Sripada & Konrath, 2011), or attention paid to the possible consequences
(Scaife &Webber, 2013). The diﬀerence in ascriptions of this sort is, in
turn, taken to explain the asymmetric ascription of intentionality.
These are interesting models, and we see no need to pick and
choose, as their adequacy has no bearing on our central argument. We
are exploring the question whether moral or normative considerations
have an impact on intentionality ascriptions in jurisprudential contexts
– no matter whether these are mediated by ascriptions of conative states,
epistemic states, deeply held values or other factors. Furthermore,
whereas some (though not all) of the factors mentioned above have
indeed proven statistically signiﬁcant mediators of outcome valence on
intentionality ascription, not a single one has been established as the
only signiﬁcant mediator. Importantly, even when controlling for the
above attitudes in mediation analyses, the direct impact of normative
considerations remains signiﬁcant (Cova, Lantian, & Boudesseul, 2016)
which suggests that ‘moral evaluations still play an irreducible role in
shaping our judgments of intentionality’ (2016: 12). The focus of this
article does not consist in adjudicating between these diﬀerent views,
but in investigating whether the judgments of legal professionals also
manifest the Knobe eﬀect. Since blame plays a central role in several
explanations of the Knobe eﬀect (e.g. Adams and Steadman (2004),
Nadelhoﬀer (2004a, 2006); for discussion cf. Knobe (2006), Sauer and
Bates (2013)) as well as more general accounts such as Alicke’s (2000,
2008) culpable control model, we have also measured blame ascrip-
tions in our experiments. To the experiments we will now turn.
2. First experiment: good v. bad outcomes
The ﬁrst experiment investigates whether professional judges em-
ploy a clinical or a morally charged concept of intentionality.
2 For two recent US Supreme Court cases see Shell Oil Co. v. United States (2009) and
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon (1995), discussed in
Kobick and Knobe (2009). Cf. also the plethora of cases regarding discriminative intent in
Kobick (2010), where side-eﬀects nearly always play a central role.
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2.1. Method
2.1.1. Participants
36 professional French judges (23 of whom were female) completed
an unpaid online questionnaire. About three times as many were con-
tacted directly via email. Sample size was determined by the number of
judges who responded to the invitation and ﬁlled out the questionnaire.
All complete data sets were used. 26 judges served at a jurisdiction de
première instance (the lowest type of court), 9 at a cour d’appel (court of
appeal) and 1 as conseiller juridique (legal advisor). 24 participants listed
criminal law as their speciality, 17 civil law, 5 social law, and 1 ad-
ministrative law and 7 other specialities (multiple answers possible).
The average professional experience was just under 17 years, ranging
from less than a year to 37 years. The native language of all participants
was French, nobody stated familiarity with the Knobe eﬀect and only
one participant stated familiarity with experimental philosophy.
2.1.2. Materials and procedure
In a within-subjects design run with Qualtrics online software,
participants were presented with both conditions of Knobe’s CHAIRMAN
scenario. The order of presentation was randomized. Participants were
asked a forced-choice yes/no question whether the chairman had
harmed/helped the environment intentionally. In a follow-up question
they had to report their agreement or disagreement with the statement
‘The chairman harmed/helped the environment intentionally’ on a 7
point Likert scale ranging again from (1) ‘strongly disagree’ to (7)
‘strongly agree’. Finally, participants were asked whether they thought
the chairman deserves praise, blame or neither for his action (cf.
Appendix 1 for vignettes and questions in French).
2.2. Results
The forced-choice responses diﬀered signiﬁcantly across conditions
(harm v. help) for both orders of presentation. Overall, 86% ascribed
intentionality in the harm case, whereas only 11% of the participants
did in the help case (McNemar exact test for N = 36, p < 0.001). 78%
of the respondents gave distinct – that is, inconsistent – answers across
the two cases. The order of presentation was insigniﬁcant, Pearson
χ2(1) = 0.122, p = 0.727 for harm and χ2(1) = 0.892, p = 0.345 for
help. 84% of the participants receiving harm ﬁrst ascribed intentionality
in the harm scenario whereas only 16% did in the help scenario
(McNemar exact test for N = 19, p < 0.001). Amongst participants
receiving the help case ﬁrst, 88% ascribed intentionality in the harm
scenario and 6% in the help scenario (McNemar exact test for N = 17,
p < 0.001). Counting ﬁrst choices only (N = 36) to mimic the be-
tween-subjects design customary in previous side-eﬀect studies, 84% of
the participants attributed intentionality in the harm condition, and 6%
in the help condition (Pearson χ2(1) = 22.087, p < 0.001). Fig. 1 re-
presents graphically that the Knobe eﬀect is at least as pronounced for
professionals (ﬁrst choices only) as for laypeople (N = 78) tested by
Knobe (2003a). For a replication with French laypeople cf. Cova and
Naar (2012, experiment 1), whose ﬁndings are very similar to Knobe’s.
On a 7-point Likert scale, mean agreement with the claim that the
chairman harmed the environment intentionally was 5.67 (SD = 1.45),
mean agreement with the claim that the chairman helped the environ-
ment was 2.56 (SD = 1.48), cf. Fig. 2. A paired-samples t-test reveals
the diﬀerence to be strongly signiﬁcant, t(35) = 8.383, p < 0.001, 95%
CI [2.36;3.87], Cohen’s d= 1.40, a large eﬀect (Cohen, 1988).
Counting ﬁrst responses only, thus mimicking a between-subjects de-
sign customary for side-eﬀect studies, increases the asymmetry some-
what: The mean agreement for harm is 5.74 (SD = 1.33), for help it is
2.18 (SD = 1.47). An independent samples t-test revealed a signiﬁcant
diﬀerence: t(34) =−7.645, p < 0.001, 95% CI [−4.51; −2.61], Co-
hen’s d= 2.55, a very large eﬀect. The ﬁndings for professional French
judges, both as regards forced-choice and Likert-scale responses re-
plicate those for laypeople. Given that the Knobe eﬀect is similarly
pronounced in both subject pools, we can conjecture that both profes-
sional judges and laypeople employ a morally charged concept of in-
tentionality. The percentage of those willing to ascribe blame in the
harm scenario (blame: 83%, no blame: 0%, neither: 17%) considerably
exceeds the one for the help scenario (blame: 20%, no blame: 6%,
neither: 74%). The diﬀerence for ﬁrst responses (N = 36) is signiﬁcant,
Pearson χ2(2) = 11.26, p = 0.004).
2.3. Discussion
The results are loud and clear: The Knobe eﬀect is just as pro-
nounced for professional judges as for laypeople, which suggests that
both groups operate with a morally charged concept of intentionality.3
The reported asymmetry in blame ascriptions is consistent with models
according to which blame plays a central role in intentionality ascrip-
tions, or the ascription of culpable control more generally. If matters
were left here, the implications both for social psychology and for the
law would be unclear. Competence theorists might argue that the fact
that experts, too, employ a charged concept of intentionality implies
that lay judgments are innocuous and that the legal deﬁnition of in-
tentionality must be brought into accord with the concept used by both
laypeople and experts. Bias theorists, by contrast, might argue that –
just as in other domains – expert judgments are not always immune
from bias (cf. e.g. Schwitzgebel and Cushman (2012, 2015)). What the
results demonstrate, on this view, is that the intuitions of legal pro-
fessionals are also distorted. Consequently, the worrisome conceptual
Fig. 1. Participants agreeing with the claim that the chairman intentionally harmed/
helped the environment for diﬀerent subject pools. Laypeople data from Knobe (2003a).
Fig. 2. Average intentionality ascriptions in the CHAIRMAN scenario, error bars designate
standard error of the mean.
3 In an experiment with 59 professional French lawyers, Kneer and Bourgeois-Gironde
(in press) report similar results. Participants received both the harm and the help vignette
of Knobe’s CHAIRMAN scenario. 59% ascribed intentionality in the harm case, while only
21% ascribed intentionality in the help case (McNemar test, p < 0.001). Importantly,
despite receiving both conditions (the order was randomized), 59% of all participants
judged the two cases diﬀerently.
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mismatch between the letter of the law and the practice of mens rea
ascription aﬄicts legal systems where trials are decided by profes-
sionals just as much as juror systems.
Which of the two views one is inclined to take depends on a variety
of background assumptions regarding inter alia the nature of bias (for a
review, see Hahn &Harris, 2014), one’s preferred account of the Knobe
eﬀect, and the systematicity and uniformity of folk-psychological con-
cepts. Some of these debates, we would like to suggest, can be cir-
cumvented by addressing the topic from a novel angle. Suppose the
Knobe eﬀect standardly conceived captures just two data points of a
broader phenomenon. Past empirical research on intentionality as-
criptions might have inappropriately focused on clear opposites, i.e.
pairs of cases contrasting negative with positive outcomes. Rather than
testing for such opposites (good v. bad) we might run experiments with
graded negative outcomes (somewhat bad v. very bad). It could turn out
that the willingness to ascribe intentionality is positively correlated
with the severity of a negative outcome. If this were the case, the
competence accounts and the recommended legal revisionism would
lose much of their plausibility: It is one thing to advocate a view ac-
cording to which foresight suﬃces for the ascription of intentionality if
the consequence is harmful. It is quite another to advocate a view ac-
cording to which the propensity of mens rea ascriptions should be
commensurate with severity of outcome. On the ﬁrst view, whether or
not I broke a vase intentionally depends, inter alia, on whether I foresaw
the consequence and on whether the consequence was undesirable. On
the second view, it depends, inter alia, on whether I foresaw the con-
sequence and on how severe the damage was. That is, whether or not my
action was intentional depends, inter alia, on the value of the vase. Note
that if there were a severity eﬀect of the kind envisioned here, then the
Knobe eﬀect could be understood as just a special case of this broader
phenomenon. Such an interpretation might cast doubt on a consider-
able number of explanations of the Knobe eﬀect, which conceive of it in
bivalent terms. More importantly for our purposes, if the mens rea
judgments of laypeople and professionals were susceptible to a severity
eﬀect, it is hard to see how the latter could not be conceived as a bias, or
how the law could reasonably be amended to make sense of it in the
ﬁrst place. For each crime, the law would have to specify minimally
required levels of harm that warrant the ascription of guilty states of
mind.
Kneer (in preparation) reports data according to which folk judg-
ments concerning the mens reas of intentionality, knowledge and
recklessness manifest a severity eﬀect. Our next experiment addresses
the question whether the judgments of legal experts are also sensitive to
severity of outcome.
3. Experiment 2: somewhat bad v. very bad outcomes
In comparison to Experiment 1 which invoked clear opposites (good
v. bad outcomes), Experiment 2 tested whether the judgments of pro-
fessional French judges are sensitive to the severity of bad outcomes.
3.1. Method
3.1.1. Participants
32 professional French judges (17 female) completed an unpaid
online questionnaire. About three times as many judges were contacted
directly by email. Sample size was determined by the number of judges
who responded to the invitation and ﬁlled out the questionnaire. All
complete data sets were used. None of the participants who had been
invited to participate in the ﬁrst study were re-contacted. 24 judges
served at a juridiction de première instance (the lowest type of court), 5 at
a cour d’appel (court of appeal) and 3 at the Cour de Cassation (the court
of cassation, the highest court in France). The average professional
experience was around 16 years, ranging from less than a year to
38 years. 20 participants listed civil law as their speciality, 19 criminal
law, 4 social law, 2 commercial law, 1 administrative law and 2 other
specialities (multiple answers possible). The native language of all
participants was French, nobody stated familiarity with the Knobe ef-
fect, one participant stated familiarity with experimental philosophy.
3.1.2. Materials and procedure
In a between-subjects design, participants were randomly assigned
one of two conditions of the BEACH TOWN scenario (cf. Appendix 2 for the
French version), in which the mayor’s actions trigger either a somewhat
bad side-eﬀect, or a very bad one:
The mayor of a small beach town is approached by his advisor who
says: “We could build a new highway connection. This would make
car traﬃc much more eﬃcient. However, there would be [minor/
severe] adverse eﬀects on the environment. During construction, the
animals in the construction zone will [be disturbed/die]. This is
[only temporary/not a temporary condition], [everything goes/
things will not go] back to normal once construction is ﬁnished.”
The mayor responds: “I don’t care at all about the environment. All I
care about is making car traﬃc as eﬃcient as possible. Let’s build
the new highway connection.”
They build the new highway connection. The animals in the zone
are [temporarily disturbed/die]. [Everything goes/Things do not
go] back to normal after construction is ﬁnished.
Participants were asked to what extent they agreed that the mayor
intentionally harmed the environment. Responses were collected on a
7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (completely disagree) to 7 (com-
pletely agree). On a separate screen, participants were asked to what
extent they deem the mayor blameworthy for his action (1 = not at all,
7 = very much).
3.2. Results
The average intentionality ascription level for the really bad condi-
tion (M = 5.18, SD = 1.74) exceeds that for the somewhat bad condi-
tion (M = 3.33, SD = 1.76), cf. Fig. 3. The diﬀerence is signiﬁcant, t
(30) =−2.97, p = 0.006, 95% CI [−3.11;−0.58], Cohen’s d = 1.06,
a large eﬀect size. The values are near-identical for blame ascriptions
(really bad: M = 5.59, SD = 1.18; somewhat bad: M = 3.53,
SD = 1.73), the diﬀerence is again signiﬁcant; t(30) =−3.98,
p < 0.001, 95% CI [−3.11; −1.00], Cohen’s d = 1.40, a large eﬀect
size.
3.3. Discussion
For professional French judges, severity of outcome correlates po-
sitively with the propensity to ascribe intentionality. This is an im-
portant ﬁnding in the debate about the impact of action outcome on
intentionality ascriptions. It lends support to the hypothesis that the
Knobe eﬀect might be but a special case of a broader severity eﬀect. The
asymmetric blame ascriptions across the two conditions is consistent
Fig. 3. Average intentionality ascriptions for the BEACH TOWN scenario across negative side-
eﬀect conditions diﬀering in severity of outcome. Error bars designate standard error of
the mean.
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with Alicke’s culpable control model. An increased attribution of in-
tentionality (i.e. volitional behavior control) might be driven by an
increased desire to blame the agent. The results are of particular sig-
niﬁcance for criminal jurisprudence: Contrary to standard legal doc-
trine, the strict diﬀerentiation between the mens reas of knowledge and
intentionality disintegrates with increasing severity of outcome, which
puts pressure on the principle of uniform and equal trial conditions for
all.
4. General discussion
Two experiments with independent groups of professional French
judges revealed that their ascriptions of intentionality – the mens rea
associated with the highest culpability – are susceptible to the Knobe
eﬀect and the newly introduced severity eﬀect. More particularly, an
asymmetry in intentionality attributions arises both for scenarios dif-
fering in outcome valence (Experiment 1, contrasting good v. bad
outcomes) and across negative outcomes of diﬀerent severity
(Experiment 2, contrasting somewhat bad with very bad outcomes).
Those who consider the severity eﬀect a bias might worry that de-
fendants who bring about more severe side eﬀects will be punished too
harshly, as the less inculpating mens rea of knowledge eﬀectively drops
out of the picture. Those who advocate a competence account, by
contrast, face a new challenge. While such views are not implausible
with respect to the Knobe eﬀect strictly conceived, the severity eﬀect
requires considerable revision. Take the increasingly popular norm-
based views (Alfano et al., 2012; Holton, 2010; Uttich & Lombrozo,
2010; Robinson, Stey, & Alfano, 2015) as an example, which (roughly)
explain the asymmetry in intentionality ascriptions in the CHAIRMAN
studies as due to a norm violation in the harm condition, and norm-
conformance in the help condition. However, in the BEACH TOWN ex-
periment, both conditions invoke a violation of a single, identical norm
(roughly: do not harm the environment). The pronounced asymmetry in
intentionality ascriptions (below the Likert scale midpoint in the
moderate condition and above the midpoint in the severe condition)
seems to be due to severity of outcome, not a bivalent factor such as
norm-conformity v. norm-violation.
Naturally, competence accounts of the Knobe eﬀect could be ex-
tended to accommodate severity of outcome on a theoretical level. But
the main practical problem, the gap between the letter of the law and
the diverging actual practice of mens rea ascription, whether eﬀected by
laypeople or professional judges, might persist. Though it is relatively
straightforward to change the law so as to accommodate the Knobe
eﬀect (for suggestions, cf. Kobick (2010) and Duﬀ (2015)), it is less
evident how the law could adopt a severity-sensitive concept of in-
tentionality without generating large-scale inner-systematic in-
coherence. Take, for instance, Coke’s Law, a principle at the foundation
of nearly every system of criminal law in the world, according to which
the assessment of mens rea and actus reus (the ‘guilty act’ or material
element) should be strictly independent from one another. Such in-
dependence in evaluation of mens rea would be impossible if it were
legally correct to look to the severity of outcome in order to establish
whether foreknowledge does or doesn’t suﬃce for the ascription of
intentionality.4
Future inquiry into mens rea ascriptions should pursue a variety of
issues that could not be addressed in this article. One important ques-
tion regards whether the severity eﬀect proves robust across diﬀerent
expressions relating to intentionality. While advocates of the ‘simple
view’ postulate a tight conceptual connection between the adjective
‘intentionally’, the verb ‘intend’ and the noun ‘intention’ (e.g. Adams,
1986, 2015; McCann, 1986, 1991), scholars such as Duﬀ (1982, 2015)
and Kobick (2010) question it. Second, it should be explored how
professionals respond when explicitly prompted to ‘judge as if in court’,
since they might operate with multiple concepts of intentionality, de-
pending on context. Third, though our ﬁndings speak to the experi-
mentally revealed concept of intentionality of professional judges, it
would also be helpful to assess what concept of intentionality they
explicitly endorse when directly asked about it. Consistency between
the experimentally revealed and explicitly endorsed concepts would
support a competence view; inconsistency would speak in favor of a
bias view since the judges would consider the results here presented as
aﬄicted by error vis-à-vis their own concept of intentionality. Fourth, in
follow-up experiments one might collect data for additional variables
such as legal culpability or deserved punishment. This would shed light
on whether outcome severity does in fact have the assumed eﬀect on
punishment (as data for laypeople reported by Cushman (2008) sug-
gests) and whether the impact is indeed mediated by choice of mens rea
type. Fifth, while we have focused exclusively on intentionality, the
problematic extends to other types of mens rea that are commonly
distinguished in criminal law (cf. US Model Penal Code, section 2.02).
Given that the Knobe eﬀect, among laypeople, can also be found for
epistemic state ascriptions, jurors and judges might be increasingly
likely to ﬁnd that an agent acted knowingly (cf. MPC 2.02 2b), or should
have been aware of a high probability of the outcome (negligence, cf. MPC
2.02 2d), the more severe the harm done (cf. MacLeod (2016), Kneer (in
preparation), Kneer and Machery (in preparation)). Future research
should investigate whether this is indeed the case, and it should also
explore whether professional judges are susceptible to the reported
eﬀects across diﬀerent cultures and legal systems. Lastly, if the severity
eﬀect is widely found to arise for experts and laypeople alike, and is
considered a bias, strategies must be devised to alleviate its impact so as
to guarantee a fair and equal trial for all.
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